Factionalism

Factionalism is a condition of political division in which rival groups pursue incompatible interests, compete for authority, and weaken the common power of the state. The book treats it not as a mere disagreement among subjects but as a structural problem of rule: factions can obstruct a sovereign, preserve the memory of former liberties, supply an invader with allies, or briefly help a ruler manage a conquered population. Its central lesson is that division may make subjects easier to handle in quiet times, yet leaves a state dangerously exposed when crisis arrives.

Factionalism and the Structure of Conquest

Factionalism first appears in the discussion of newly acquired territories. A state joined to an old dominion is easier to retain when its language, customs, and laws resemble those of the conqueror, because the population can gradually be incorporated without a deep conflict of political habits. France is presented as an example of such continuity: Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy had long been united to France despite slight differences of language. The prudent conqueror must preserve the existing laws and taxes while destroying the former ruling line, so that the new possession becomes part of the hereditary dominion rather than remaining a separate political body.

The danger is greater where the acquired country differs in language, usages, and laws. There, unfamiliar institutions and competing loyalties multiply the opportunities for disorder. Residence by the Prince can limit the growth of factional conflict because disturbances are detected early, the population is less exposed to predatory officials, and the ruler becomes personally present as both a source of fear and a possible recourse. Colonies offer another means of securing strategic points, while military occupation supplies a more expensive alternative. These methods seek to prevent local divisions from becoming organized resistance or from providing an opening to a foreign enemy.

The problem becomes most acute in cities and provinces accustomed to their own laws and freedom. Such communities retain a political memory that can be revived whenever the conqueror suffers misfortune. The book identifies three possible methods of holding them: destruction, personal residence, or preservation under their own laws with tribute and a government composed of selected inhabitants. Yet the last arrangement remains precarious. A dependent government may support the new Prince, but the city’s remembered liberty can still serve as a banner for rebellion. A free city therefore preserves the very traditions through which factional opposition can later be organized.

Roman Factions and the Weakness of the Church

The clearest example of factionalism is the political condition of Italy before the French invasion. Italy was divided among the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These powers sought both to prevent an armed foreigner from entering Italy and to stop any one of their number from enlarging its territory. The Roman Barons were especially useful in restraining the Pope because they were divided into the rival factions of the Orsini and the Colonnesi. Their continuing feud, conducted under arms in the presence of the Pontiff, kept the Papacy weak and insecure.

This division also explains why individual Popes struggled to consolidate temporal authority. Even a courageous Pope such as Sixtus could rarely overcome the institutional weakness created by the short duration of papal reigns. With the average life of a Pope described as roughly ten years, one pontiff could scarcely subdue one faction before his successor, hostile to the other, restored it. A Pope who had nearly exterminated the Colonnesi might be followed by an enemy of the Orsini who lacked the time to finish the work against the Colonnesi and instead revived them. The repeated alternation prevented either faction from being permanently eliminated and made the temporal power of the Popes little respected in Italy.

The rise of Pope Alexander VI marked a change because he demonstrated what papal authority could accomplish when supported by money, arms, and the actions of Cesare Borgia. Although Alexander’s immediate purpose was to enlarge his son’s power rather than the Church’s, the resulting conquests strengthened the Church indirectly. After Alexander’s death and the removal of Cesare Borgia, the Church inherited the political gains produced by their campaign. Pope Julius II then found the Roman Barons exhausted and their factions shattered by Alexander’s blows, giving the Church a stronger base from which to act.

Factionalism as a Deliberate Instrument

The book distinguishes between divisions that arise from political conflict and divisions deliberately encouraged by a ruler. Earlier rulers in Italy were accustomed to saying that Pistoja should be held by feuds and Pisa by fortresses. The principle was to promote quarrels within subject towns so that they could be retained with less effort. Such a policy might appear prudent when Italy was relatively balanced, because competing groups would be too occupied with one another to unite against their master.

The Venetians adopted a related method in cities under their authority. They fostered the Guelf and Ghibelline factions and prevented bloodshed while encouraging the disputes to continue. The purpose was to keep the citizens absorbed in internal quarrels and therefore less able to conspire against Venetian rule. The policy, however, failed decisively after the Venetian defeat at Vaila. One faction suddenly gained confidence and deprived Venice of its entire territory. Internal division had not secured the state; it had supplied the conditions for its sudden collapse.

The reason for this failure is military as well as political. A divided city cannot reliably act as a unified defensive body. When an enemy approaches, the weaker faction may join the invader, while the stronger faction lacks the strength to stand alone. Factionalism thus converts domestic rivalry into an external security risk. It also reveals weakness in the ruler, because a strong government would not permit divisions to become independent political forces. Factional management works only while peace prevents the consequences from becoming visible.

Romagna: From Disorder to Administrative Unity

The career of Cesare Borgia in Romagna offers a contrasting example. The province had been governed by weak Lords who preferred to plunder their subjects rather than correct them. Their rule produced division, robbery, tumult, and every kind of outrage. The disorder was not simply the absence of authority; it was a fragmented political landscape in which local powers had little reason to cooperate and the population lacked a common expectation of justice.

After taking Romagna, Cesare Borgia appointed Remiro d’Orco as a stern and decisive governor with full powers. Remiro restored tranquillity and order in a short time, but the very concentration of authority that made this possible risked generating hatred against the Duke. Cesare therefore replaced the extraordinary regime with a civil Tribunal at the center of the province, appointing an excellent President and giving every town representation through its advocate. The institutional change redirected rule from the personal severity of a minister toward a more regular administrative structure.

Cesare then used Remiro’s punishment to separate the memory of cruelty from his own political image. To persuade the people that the harshness had originated in the minister’s disposition rather than in the Duke, he had Remiro beheaded and displayed in the market place of Cesena beside a block and bloody axe. The spectacle both astonished and satisfied the populace. It was a calculated effort to dissolve resentment, reclaim goodwill, and transform a formerly divided and violent province into a territory that could recognize Cesare’s authority.

Popular and Elite Factions in Civil Rule

Factionalism also defines the internal structure of a civil principality. Every city contains two opposed humours: the people do not wish to be dominated or oppressed by the nobles, while the nobles wish to dominate and oppress the people. From this conflict arise three possible outcomes—principality, liberty, or licence. A Prince may therefore be elevated either by the nobles, who seek a leader to shelter their domination, or by the people, who seek protection from the nobles.

The two routes create different political vulnerabilities. A Prince raised by the nobles has difficulty maintaining himself because many around him consider themselves his equals and cannot be governed as readily as ordinary subjects. The nobles’ demands cannot be satisfied without harming others, since their underlying aim is domination. A Prince supported by the people stands more nearly alone, but the people ask only not to be oppressed, and their demands can be met without injuring the community. Their numbers make them difficult to secure against if they become hostile, yet the danger posed by the nobles is more complex: nobles can desert, conspire, and choose the moment most favorable to their own safety.

The prudent Prince must distinguish among nobles rather than treating them as a single body. Those who attach themselves to his fortunes without being grasping should be loved and honored. Those held back by timidity may be used, especially if they are prudent, because they can bring distinction in prosperity without becoming dangerous in adversity. Ambitious nobles who deliberately refuse attachment are different. Their independence signals that they value themselves above the Prince, and their interests will lead them to help destroy him when his position weakens.

A ruler who comes to power through popular favor should preserve good relations with the people, a task made easier because they chiefly desire freedom from oppression. A Prince raised by the nobles against popular will must instead conciliate the people by placing himself under their protection. Those treated well by a ruler they expected to treat them badly may become more grateful than subjects whose support originally created his power. The essential point is that a Prince needs a friendly people as a resource in adversity. Nabis of Sparta could face the combined forces of Greece and a victorious Roman army because only a few of his subjects needed watching; a hostile population would have made such security impossible.

Political Consequences and Significance

The book’s general conclusion is that a Prince has little to fear from conspiracy when his subjects are well disposed, but has reason to fear everything when they are hostile and detest him. Wise rulers therefore prevent both the nobility from being driven to desperation and the commons from becoming discontented. Factionalism is dangerous not merely because it divides opinion, but because it converts dissatisfaction into organized capacity: nobles possess craft, foresight, and access to rival powers, while popular hostility can deprive a ruler of the social foundation needed to endure crisis.

The example of Bologna shows the force of popular attachment against a factional conspiracy. Messer Annibale Bentivoglio was murdered by the Canneschi, leaving only the infant Messer Giovanni from his immediate line. The people rose and killed all the Canneschi. Their action resulted from the general goodwill enjoyed by the House of the Bentivogli. When no one remained in Bologna capable of governing, the citizens went to Florence to find a supposed descendant of the family—believed until then to be the son of a smith—and entrusted him with the government until Messer Giovanni became old enough to rule. Popular loyalty could therefore overcome a murderous faction and preserve dynastic authority.

France supplies the institutional counterpart to this lesson. Its Parliament was established as an intermediary capable of restraining the ambition and arrogance of the nobles while protecting the commons from the hatred and fear directed against them. By assigning this responsibility to a third party, the constitutional arrangement spared the King the direct odium of favoring one side against the other. The Prince should likewise delegate matters that generate responsibility and retain those associated with grace and favor, honoring the great without making himself hated by the people. Factionalism is thus not defeated by pretending that social conflict does not exist; it is managed through institutions that prevent rival interests from turning their conflict into a direct war against the sovereign or the state.